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Introduction

In recent years, scholars and policy makers have become increasingly interested
in various techniques of political forecasting (Bueno de Mesquita, 1998; Gaddis, 19921993, Ray and Russett, 1996). The logic of theories and theory-testing implies that the
ultimate aim of science is to explain, predict, and ultimately exert control over events
(Lakatos, 1970; Gaddis, 1996; Bueno de Mesquita, 1996). If a given outcome is
associated with some factor across a large number of historical cases, we should expect
the same relationship to occur in the future. Consequently, the future may serve as
arbiter of theoretical controversies, contributing to scientific progress (Ray and Russett,
1996).
Although theoretical accuracy is beneficial for the accumulation of scientific
knowledge, it is also useful for policy makers in anticipating likely scenarios and
formulating policy. But much of the international relations conflict research focuses on
causal mechanisms for war located at the national or dyadic level. For example, such
factors as military capabilities, alliance relationships, and domestic regime type are
thought to influence the probability of conflict between a pair of states (Wayman, 2000:
219

234). These studies tend to overlook systemic distributional patterns of

international conflict behavior as well as conflict interdependencies that may lead to the
widening of wars (e.g., contagion) or the onset of concurrent conflicts (exceptions
include Mintz and Schrodt, 1987; Schrodt and Mintz, 1988). In other words, conflict
itself may cause more conflict - international disputes may create opportunities for other
states to enter an existing fray or initiate an additional dispute to make changes in the
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international status quo. Yet relatively little research has sought to gauge the influence of
conflict on subsequent conflict. To what extent are conflicts independent of each other?
That is, do states decide to act without taking into consideration the actions of states
around them? In contrast, to what extent are conflicts interdependent? What do these
interactions indicate about the future of Middle East conflict?
To address these questions, I examine conflict interactions among Middle Eastern
states within the context of the Cold War and post-Cold War structures using conditional
probability analysis. The idea of being able to predict future political events based on the
current political actions of states is consistent with the logic of other theoretical
approaches as well as intuitively appealing. According to Schrodt and Mintz (1988),
"there is a solid theoretical basis for assuming that the policy actions of one nation
depend on those of other nations." For example, a prominent theoretical approach rooted
in conditional probability as a method of analysis is Richardson's arms race model
(Schrodt and Mintz, 1988: 218). This theory was developed during the Cold War era, and
its basic idea is that having a large supply of weapons makes a state more war-prone, and
the decisions and actions of a given state are greatly affected by another state's decision
to build up their arms (Richardson Arms Race Model, 2002). Accordingly, Richardson's
theory exploits conditional probability analysis by taking into account the
interdependence of decision making among states.
It is also intuitively plausible to say that states not only take the political activities

of other individual states into consideration when making policy decisions; they are also
significantly influenced by the dyadic interactions that occur among their neighbors and
within their region, as well as within the broader international political system. Thus,
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rather than simply analyze national or dyadic behaviors, I study a variety of international
interactions within the Middle Eastern subsystem as a whole. By using the conditional
probability analysis method, I should be able to determine, based on my observations of
the Middle East, whether or not this technique can be used to make political predictions
in all types of international conflict.
This conditional probability analysis will address two major issues. First, I
assess the extent to which the occurrence of one dyadic interaction affects the
probabilities of other interactions in the subsystem. 1 Second, I use the results to explore
implications for Middle East conflict in the future.
In the next section, I will utilize a literature review to better illustrate the origins
of this movement in political science towards conflict analysis as a means of forecasting.
I will then move to a discussion of the theory behind the hypothesis, followed by a
section outlining the data collection and analysis process used in this project. Finally, I
will discuss the results and conclude.

Literature Review

The purpose of theories is to explain and - by implication

predict phenomena of

interest (Ray and Russett, 1996). A bold few political scientists have developed
frameworks to deal with prediction, typically referred to as political forecasting (Bueno
de Mesquita, 1984). According to John Gaddis (1992 - 1993), political science has yet to
produce an international relations theory that can consistently predict future political

1 A directed dyad refers to a pair of states in which one state is identified as the initiator and the other state
is identified as the target.

3

events. In 1948, Morgenthau, the father of political realism, wrote that "trustworthy
prophecies in international politics would never be possible, because contradictory
theories would always be present in every political situation: which of them would
prevail was anybody's guess (Gaddis, 1992

1993: 7)."

According to Waltz, "to explain how peace can be more readily achieved requires
an understanding of the causes ofwar.,,2 "In recent years, there has been increasing
interest in the quantitative international relations community on the analysis of
international events (Schrodt and Mintz, 1988: 217)." There has been a movement to
understand and analyze individual events rather than relying solely on "measures such as
power, development and status (Schrodt and Mintz, 1988: 217)." Efforts to make sense of
the data are increasingly included in under the rubric: causal mechanisms for war. There
are several causal mechanisms for war that are studied in international relations including
alliances, capabilities, rivalries, territories, and arms races (Vasquez, 2000). All of these
factors depend on a variety of conditions, and democracies act differently than nondemocracies in some situations. So, these factors do not cause war anytime and anyplace,
but under the right conditions, can, in fact, lead to conflict.
Alliances lead to war when a conflict occurs between two states, and as a result,
several outside states are brought into a conflict simply because they have a formal
alliance with one of the two states involved in the original conflict (Maoz, 2000: 111-

145). Capabilities cause war when a state overestimates their own capabilities,
underestimates the target state's capabilities, or does both simultaneously, when deciding
to go to war (Leng, 2000: 235-280). Rivalries cause conflicts, and a majority of conflict
between two states is followed by another conflict between the same two states. There are
2

Quoted in Gaddis, 1992-1993:9
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many factors that could contribute to such rivalries, like territorial disputes or
nationalism, but what is important I that these rival states will most likely engage in
conflict periodically (Wayman, 2000: 219-234). Territory causes conflict for obvious
reasons. If two states believe the same territory belongs to them, war is likely to result.
Finally, arms races are important causal mechanisms for war. It is important to note that
aside from the use of nuclear weapons in W orId War II, there has not been any type of
conflict that could be categorized as a "nuclear war". However, conflict has occurred as a
result of the race for nuclear weapons or the threat of use of nuclear weapons.
In spite of criticism of the ability of social scienceto predict the future (Gaddis,
1992

1993), future interactions among states have been a common focus in political

science (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita, 1986; Mintz and Schrodt, 1988; Ray and Russett,
1996). For example, expected utility theory is one method used in political science to
predict future state interactions. Developed in economics,·this theory "involves
mathematical, deductive models applied to broad questions of political analysis,
combined with the use of the detailed knowledge of expert analysts, to offer strategies
and answers directly relevant to forecasting problems" (Bueno de Mesquita, 1984: 227).
Its origins in economics can be seen in the following formula used by Bueno de Mesquita
to calculate the expected utility of players in a given political situation (Bueno de
Mesquita, 1984: 227):

Expected Net Gain

(Probability ofSuccess)*(Available Policy Gains) +

(Probability of Failure)*(Possible Policy Setbacks) + (Net Marginal
Expected Impact of Third Parties)
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Expected utility theory takes into account expert opinions on political matters
while also "provid[ing] an ability to answer 'what if questions by varying data inputs
and performing alternative simulations" (Bueno de Mesquita, 1984: 231).
Compared to expected utility, a more intuitive approach to prediction is
conditional probability (Schrodt and Mintz, 1988; Avenhaus, et aI., 1989). The general
expectation of conditional probability technique is that the probability of a phenomenon
occurring will be different (more or less) than the unconditional probability of observing
that phenomenon. Interactions between pairs of states may be characterized by the
conditional probability peA /B)

peA & B)/P(B); where A is the occurrence of an

interaction from X directed toward Y([X
by nation M directed to nation N ([M

~

~

V]) and B is the occurrence of an interaction

N]). Schrodt and Mintz (1988) point to three

possibilities. First, the probability of an interaction in one dyad will be greater when there
has also been an event in another dyad, or P(AIB) > peA). Second, the dyadic events may
be independent; that is, P(NB) = peA). Finally, the occurrence of an event in one dyad
may decrease the possibility of an occurrence of an event in another (saturation effect);
P(AIB) < peA).

Practically anything can be regarded as the conditioning, or "given," factor.
Indeed, much of the multiple variable regression work is rooted in the idea of conditional
probabilities

or at least conditional means (Schrodt and Mintz, 1988). The main

difference between statistical research and more basic conditional probability analysis is
that the latter typically identifies only one concept or genera~ class of events to measure
and assess - e.g., types of interactions, previous behavior, erosion, etc. In one study
rooted in the conditional probability method in political forecasting (Avenhaus, et aI.,
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1989), the authors observe that President Kennedy predicted the probability of war
between the United States and the Soviet Union to be between 113 and 1/2 (Avenhaus, et
aI., 1989: 91). Presumably, the President did not use any kind of systematic approach in
making this prediction, and other world leaders have made similar types of predictions,
also without any type of rigorous approach. Using a conditional probability analysis
based on a constant reduction factor, a non-constant reduction factor, changes in the
starting probability of nuclear war, and the reduction factor after that first year Avenhaus
and colleagues (1989: 92) concluded the following: there will most likely always be a
possibility of nuclear war, but it decreases every year; the occurrence of nuclear war is
highly unlikely, and if it does happen, it is a significant amount of years away from
happening (Avenhaus, et aI., 1989: 99). So far, this prediction has proven to be accurate.

In another study rooted in conditional probability analysis, Schrodt and Mintz
(1988) applied the technique to international conflict in order to attempt to make
predictions about the political future of a specific region. Using six Middle Eastern
countries from 1948 to 1978 in their analysis (Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
and Iran), Schrodt and Mintz (1988) found that Kuwait was "effectively a pawn, and
hence it is attractive as a target of threats (e.g., from Iraq)" (Schrodt and Mintz, 1988:
228). Iraq's aggression towards Kuwait in the nineties was the cause of the Gulf War, and
was, in effect, predicted by this analysis.
The basic hypothesis of Schrodt and Mintz's study is that "dyads have
substantially greater possibilities of interaction when there are other dyads interacting in
the system. This pattern of interdependence indicates that certain interactions in the
system are more likely to set off interactions than others" (Schrodt and Mintz, 1988:
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223). Units in a system of any kind are not independent of each other. That is, states do
not often make decisions without first being influenced by the actions of another state or
without taking into consideration the possible implications of their decision. The
interactions of pairs or groups of entities affect the interactions of other pairs or groups of
entities as a general principle. The current project takes Schrodt and Mintz (1988) as a
point of departure and seeks to partly replicate and update their findings using a different
data set and more states.

Theory

The main hypothesis of this project is that dyadic interactions are interdependent.
In this study, the term interdependence refers to the way in which states in a system
'-'"

interact with each other; that is, how the actions of one state affect the actions of another.
Essentially, a dyadic interaction in a given system will most likely result in action among
other dyads in that same system. One conflict between two states is likely to set off one
or more conflicts among other dyads; this type of interaction can be compared to a chain
reaction effect. Because of this interdependence, a particular conflict is rarely contained
in one dyad. Rather, any type of political action may very likely permeate an entire
system.
One simple example of this type of interdependence can be found in a typical
office setting. Assume that there is an office manager, a secretary, and several employees.
If the office manager and the secretary have some type of interaction, other pairs of
individuals in the office may interact as welL For instance, if the secretary complains to
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the office manager about being mistreated by other employees in the office, several types
of interactions may occur. First, this could set off individual interactions between the
office manager and other office employees about the issues brought to the manager's
attention by the secretary. It could also set off interactions between office employees and
the secretary, because the office employees could be unhappy with the secretary's
decision to "report" them to the manager. Separately, the original interaction between the
secretary and manager can also cause other pairs of employees to interact among
themselves. One pair of employees could have some type of interaction that involved
them being unhappy with the secretary's actions. Another pair of employees might have
an interaction in which one employee attempts to outperform another employee, because
they might be worried about their job security as a result of the secretary's complaints to
the manager.
The "office" analogy can be applied, on a larger scale, to interactions among
dyads on the international stage. Schrodt and Mintz outline six types of interactions. They
are reciprocal interaction, actor initiation, target initiation, actor reaction, target reaction,
and remote reaction (Schrodt and Mintz, 1988: 223), and they can also be found in Table
1. The reciprocal interaction pattern refers to one state (country X) targeting another state
(country V), with the targeted state (Y) retaliating against the original actor (X). One
illustration of the reciprocal pattern is Iraq's (X) invasion of Iran (Y) in 1980. In
response, Iran attacked Iraq, beginning the Iran-Iraq war, which lasted until 1988.
Another type of interaction is the actor initiation pattern. This pattern is characterized by
Country X first attacking Country Y and then attacking some third country - Country M.
One example of this can be found when the United States (X) initiated disputes with
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Russia (Y), Iran (M), and Iraq (M) all in 1997. The target initiation pattern is found when
Country X attacks Country Y, and Country M then also attacks Country Y. An example
of this is the Yom Kippur War of 1973 in which the Syrians (X) and Egyptians (M)
attacked Israel (Y). The actor reaction pattern is when Country X attacks Country Y, and
Country M attacks Country X. This characterizes the events of the Gulf War in the 1990s.
Iraq (X) attacked Kuwait (Y), and the United States (M), in tum, attacked Iraqi forces.
The target reaction pattern is seen when Country X attacks Country Y, and Country Y
attacks Country M. This was illustrated in 1990 when Iraq (X) targeted Israel (Y), and
Israel then initiated a dispute against Jordan (M). The final interaction pattern is remote
reaction. This pattern is found when Country X initiates against Country Y, and Country
M initiates against Country N. One example of this is in 1983, when the United States
(X) targeted Iran (Y), and Syria (M) then initiated against Israel (N). These six patterns of
'-"'.

interdependence encompass all possible interactions among states and dyads.
The application of the conditional probability approach to political forecasting
first requires the collection of all recorded interactions between each dyad in a system.
Once the data have been collected, the number of conditional probabilities being
analyzed must be determined. In the Middle East example, Schrodt and Mintz (1988)
were looking at 30 directed dyads. "The probability of an interaction in any dyad can be
conditional on any of the remaining 29 dyads, and thus we are examining a total of 870
(30 X 29) conditional probabilities" (Schrodt and Mintz, 1988: 222). Once this has been
determined, the six possible patterns of interactions are applied to each set of conditional
probabilities to examine the interdependence patterns of the system. In the next section, I
describe this process in greater detail.
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Data and Methods

In this study, 110 total directed dyads are being observed over a period of 22
years for a total of2420 dyads. We are examining 11990 (110 X 109) conditional
probabilities. Following Schrodt and Mintz (1988), I computed unconditional
probabilities for each dyad and then conditional probabilities for each type of interaction.
I used a difference in means test to determine whether there is a significant statistical
difference between the average unconditional and conditional probabilities. Using the
mean probabilities of each pattern, I also conducted a t test to determine if any individual
pattern is representative of international events in general.
I use the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data set (Ghosn, et aI., 2001) to
identify conflict interactions among the United States, USSR/Soviet Union, Iran, Iraq,
Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait from 1979 to 200l.
Table 2 lists all of the states involved in this research and shows a basic ratio of all of the
times a state was the initiator versus the target in the aforementioned time period. This
study is based on the interaction of dyads, meaning a pair of states. To speak of a directed
dyad refers to the direction of an interaction within a dyad; that is, the initiator and target
are identified within the dyad. The MID data set determines which state in a dyad (X or
Y) is the initiator of the conflict by looking at which party was responsible for the first
recorded codeable action. So, a state can be considered the initiator of a conflict by
simply making a formal threat to use force; an actual use of force is not required.
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Among the directed dyads made up of the states found in Table 2, we aggregated
incident frequencies by year, which can be found in Table 3. The MID data set records
the highest level of hostility reached in each directed dyadic interaction, ranging from 1
to 5. A hostility level of 1 indicates that a state was targeted but did not reciprocate.
Hostility level 2 indicates a threat to use force, while 3 indicates a display of force. Level
4 is an actual use of force, and level 5 is war (Ghosn, et aI., 2003). It is important to note
that an action such as a bombing of a military base was considered equal to a full-scale
war or invasion in this study. In other words, a conflict with a hostility level of 1 was
computed equally with conflicts of higher levels. Every conflict in this study carried the
same weight in my calculations.
Using the incident data, I calculated the probabilities for seven different patterns:
Unconditional probability, reciprocal interaction, actor initiation, target initiation, actor
"-".

reaction, target reaction, and remote reaction. To calculate the unconditional probability
of interaction among any given dyad in any given year, I divided the number of years
Country X initiated against Country Y by the total number of annual observations
between the two countries. I then calculated the conditional probability of reciprocal
interaction by computing the number of times Country X reciprocates against Country Y.
The conditional probability of actor initiation was calculated by dividing the number of
times Country X initiates against any other country more than once in a given year by the
total number of initiations by Country X. To compute the conditional probability of target
initiation, the number of times Country X was a target of any other country more than
once during a given year by the total number of times Country X was targeted. To find
the conditional probability of the actor reaction pattern, the number of times any Country
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M initiates against Country X during a year in which Country X has initiated against
Country Y is divided by the total number of initiations by Country X. The conditional
probability of target reaction is found by dividing the number of years in which Country
Y initiates against Country M by the number of times in which Country Y is targeted by
Country X in the same years. To calculate the conditional probability of remote reaction,
I identified all of the years of dyadic interactions. For each dyad, I counted the total
amount of initiations. I then counted the number of interactions between Country M and
Country N during the same years of initiation. So, for example, if Country X initiated 6
times against Country Y in 1982 and 1996, and Country M initiated against Country S 1
time in 1982 and 2 times in 1996, the conditional probability for remote reaction would
be (1 +2=3)/6 = .5. So, the conditional probability of remote reaction for Country X

~

Country Y is .5.
After calculating all seven patterns of interaction, I used a difference of means test
to assess the hypothesis. I calculated the means and variances for all seven patterns and
plugged those numbers into this formula:

t
(J"2

1
----+
N 1 -1
N 2 -1

The

Yt

term represents the mean for the unconditional probability pattern. The

Y2

term

represents the mean for each conditional probability pattern. The a t2 term stands for the
variance of the unconditional probability pattern, and the

ai term represents the variance

for each conditional probability pattern. The Nt term stands for the sample size of the
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unconditional probability pattern, and the N2 tenn stands for the sample size of each
conditional probability pattern. The sample size varied for each, ranging from 11 (actor
initiation, target initiation, and actor reaction) to 110 (reciprocal interaction).
Once the t score was calculated comparing unconditional probability with each of
the other six patterns, I used a table of critical values of t distribution (Johnson, et aI.,
2001: 459) to detennine whether or not statistically significant differences exist between
these patterns. I also used the mean probabilities of each pattern in the following fonnula:

t=~
a

The p tenn represents the mean of each conditional probability pattern, and the a tenn
represents the standard deviation of each pattern.
The results from this test were compared against a table of critical values of t
distribution (Johnson, et aI., 2001: 459) to find if any of the individual patterns are
statistically significant.

Results

Now, I will discuss the results of this study and their relation to our general
hypothesis. We will start by examining the basic unconditional probabilities and then
compare them with data concerning the conditional probability patterns of international
events. Then, I will discuss the results of my analysis of the data and its implications.
First, it is important to understand the unconditional probability of interaction
among all possible directed dyads before we are able to compare and analyze the
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conditional probabilities. Table 2 gives us a general idea of the international conflicts that
occurred among the states in this study from 1979 to 2001. The second column of this
table lists the number of times each state was involved in a conflict as the actor initiator,
and the third column lists the number of times each state was involved in a conflict as the
targeted state. The fourth column compares these two numbers in a ratio for each state.
Three interesting observations can be made from this table. First, the United
States, Iran, Iraq, and Egypt all have ratios over 1. This is slightly misleading, however,
because Egypt initiated conflict 3 times over a 22-year period, while Iran initiated
conflict 22 times over the same period of time. It is also worth noticing that Iraq was
targeted 21 times by other states, which is by far the most of any country in this study.
This could be attributed, in part, to the Gulf War and the weapons inspections that took
place in the 1990s, because 17 out of the 21 conflicts targeting Iraq took place from 1991
to 2000. The United States targeted Iraq 6 times during that time period, and Kuwait
targeted Iraq 4 times. Egypt and Israel also each targeted Iraq for a total of 4 times, but
Iran targeted Iraq 7 times (the most of any other state). Since Iran targeted Iraq
sporadically throughout the entire observed time period, it seems that Iran is always
targeting Iraq for one reason or another, but, unlike the other states (United States,
Kuwait, etc.), Iran's actions are most likely not categorically related to the Gulf War and
the weapons inspections in the 1990s. Also, it seems interesting that states that attempt to
stay out of international armed conflict end up being picked on by other states in the
region; neither Jordan nor Saudi Arabia initiated conflict during this 22-year span, yet
they were both targeted by neighboring countries on several occasions.
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In contrast to Table 2, Table 3 provides a bit more of an in-depth look at the
dyadic interaction patterns found within the data. Here again, there are a few especially
interesting observations worth noting. Iranian leadership, especially recently, has made
no secret of its ill-will and hatred towards Israel. However, Iran, while being one of the
most active initiators in the study, did not target Israel once from 1979 to 2001. It should
also be observed that Iran, Syria, and Israel are the top three countries in terms of how
many states they targeted during the specified time period. Accordingly, there are nine
Middle Eastern countries in this study. Out of those nine, five countries are fairly
peaceful. The remaining four, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Israel, tend to cause the most trouble
in the region. The United States is friendly with only one of those four states: Israel. In
contrast, the United States is certainly not on good terms with Iran and Syria, and is in the
middle of a war in Iraq. The American public, in general, is not aware of much of the
world's sentiment about the American-Israeli relationship (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006).
For many Americans, it might be difficult to understand where this sentiment stems from,
but the information in Table 3 presents an idea of why many foreigners, especially
Middle Easterners, might question the seemingly biased relationship the United States
has with Israel in contrast to Iran, Iraq, and Syria.
Table 4 lists the mean rank and t score of unconditional probability and each
conditional probability by pattern. This table illustrates a main idea of conditional
probability analysis that by having knowledge about the types of conditions that cause
dyadic interactions, we can effectively predict future interactions. One very basic
observation is that the mean unconditional probability is significantly less than even the
lowest mean of any conditional probability interaction pattern. So, it is clear that any type
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of conditional probability can provide more information about future events than
unconditional probability. The remote reaction pattern has the largest mean probability of
any pattern, and the t test indicates that remote reaction is an accurate representation of
the population as a whole. So, out of any conditional probability, the remote reaction
pattern could most usefully be applied to future political events in any dyad or system. It
is important to understand that this significant finding is not merely coincidence. When
other states see a conflict occur in their region, they are much more likely to engage in a
conflict of their own than to anxiously await the results of the ongoing conflict to see
what the implications for the region will be. In other words, states see conflict as an
opportunity to make changes to the status quo through force of arms.
Table 5 contains the results from the difference of means test, which compared
unconditional probability against each of the other six interaction patterns. This analysis
is consistent with the mean ranking of Table 4 and with the hypothesis. In all but one
instance, the conditional probability tests are statistically significant when stacked against
the unconditional probabilities. Target initiation, target reaction, and remote reaction
ranked highest on Table 4, and Table 5 shows that they are statistically significant
compared to the unconditional probability. Overall, I think that Table 5 supports the
central hypothesis of this project, which was that conflict in a region only causes more
conflict because of the interdependence present in any given system, and that the
conditional probability analysis of Middle Eastern conflict data, when compared with an
unconditional probability analysis of the same data, may prove to be superior in making
reliable predictions about future conflict in the Middle East and around the world.
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Obviously, unconditional probability analysis is not enough when attempting to predict
international political events.
The apparent statistical significance of the data suggests that using conditional
probability as a method of analysis appears to provide implications for future events in
the Middle East and could even be applied to the overall international system.

Conclusion

In the field of political science and international relations, the past thirty years has
seen a surge of interest in the idea of using some type of scientific method to predict
future political events. One of the theories that arose out of this field of study is the use
conditional probability as a method analysis. Used in this study, conditional probability
,..,,'

analysis offers us a way to systematically analyze events data and apply it to the
international system. More specifically, in this study, we wanted to find out two things:
First, we wanted to evaluate how significantly dyadic interactions affect the probability
of the occurrence of subsequent interactions within that system. Second, we wanted to
examine the possible implications of conditional probability analysis in terms of
predicting future political events in the Middle East.
Based on the results of the study, it is fair to conclude that dyadic interactions in a
region have a high probability of causing another type of interaction within the same
region. However, conditional probability breaks down the framework of international
events in such a way that gives us a more consistent and accurate means of political
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forecasting. The tables show that conditional probability analysis can be used as a reliable
mechanism for predicting future political events.
Within the Middle Eastern region, using the conditional probability method of
analysis can have significant implications and effects. Let us take a look at a few
scenarios that have developed since 2001 (the last year of data collected for this study). In
2003, the United States invaded Iraq. Could this event have been predicted by the results
of our study? By simply looking at Table 3, which lists the unconditional probabilities for
every dyad, it is interesting to note that the probability of the U.S. targeting Iraq is .2609
compared to a significantly smaller probability of Iraq targeting the U.S. of .087. This
information alone is not very valuable, so let us analyze this conflict using the
corresponding conditional probability pattern, actor initiation.
Soon after the September 11 attacks, the United States invaded Afghanistan
~

because of its suspected relationship with Osama Bin-Laden and AI-Qaeda. Fairly soon
after that, the United States began preparations to invade Iraq, also because of its
suspected terrorist ties. Before the actual invasion of Iraq, one of the arguments for war
espoused by the White House was that Saddam Hussein had strong connections to AIQaeda, and had, in effect, supported the September 11 terrorist attacks in New York City.
One of the more official reasons for war was Hussein's continued violations of United
Nations deadlines and sanctions. So, in this scenario, September 11 prompted the United
States to engage in an actor initiation pattern. This pattern is characterized by Country X
(U.S.) targeting Country Y (Afghanistan) and Country X (U.S.) also targeting Country M
(Iraq). It is important to note that when compared to unconditional probability using a
difference of means test, the actor initiation pattern proved to be statistically stronger.
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Given the strength of the actor initiation pattern compared to unconditional probability,
compounded with the statistical strength of the actor initiation pattern itself, I think that
once the United States invaded Afghanistan, it was very apparent that Iraq was next.
Another serious conflict that arose in the Middle East after 2001 was the
Hezbollah

Israeli conflict of 2006. In this instance, given the parties involved, I am

relaxing the assumptions about states as the only relevant actors and allowing terrorist
groups to be considered actors. This conflict falls under the target initiation pattern.
Members of the Hamas organization first targeted Israel in the Gaza strip, and soon after
that, members of Hezbollah targeted Israel on the Lebanese border. I think this can be
attributed to many factors. First of all, from 1979 to 2001, Lebanon targeted only one
other state: Israel. So, while Lebanon did not technically target Israel in this case, it is
easy to see why a terrorist organization might be able to operate within its borders against
Israel. Second, in contrast, Iran has not targeted Israel once from 1979 to 2001, despite its
many threats to do so and its overt hatred of Israel. So, since Hezbollah is something of
an Iranian state-sponsored terrorist organization, it seems that this would be an outlet for
Iran to target Israel without officially doing so. Third, part of our basic hypothesis is that
conflict in a region simply causes more conflict. This seems to be especially true in a
situation like Israel's, because they have been a victim of target initiation several times
throughout their short history. The difference between the target initiation pattern and
unconditional probability, and the statistical significance of the pattern itself is enough to
suggest that when Hamas targeted Israel, Hezbollah's attack could have been predicted
fairly accurately using the target initiation pattern.
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While the Iranians have not been involved in any conflict, technically, since 2001,
they have no doubt become a major player in the region, particularly since the American
invasion of Iraq. They have made blatant threats toward the United States and Israel,
while continuing to ignore the United Nations and the rest of the world by actively
seeking and building nuclear capabilities, as well as vehemently speaking out against the
Western involvement in the Middle East. What does our conditional probability analysis
suggest about future conflicts involving Iran?
As the political situation in Iraq continues to deteriorate, it seems that there is a
high probability for Iran to target Iraq in some way. Simply looking at the unconditional
probability of Iran initiating against Iraq supports this idea; the unconditional probability
is .3044, which is the highest probability in any dyadic interaction in which Iran is the
initiator. Even more convincing, the target initiation pattern suggests that this is the case.
The United States (Country X) initiated against Iraq (Country Y), which implies that the
probability of Iran (Country M) also targeting Iraq is very high. In fact, the values in
Table 4 show that the target initiation pattern has the second highest mean conditional
probability rank of any other pattern we observed. Also, the results of the difference of
means test found in Table 5 show that especially when compared to unconditional
probability, the target initiation pattern is a very reliable method of political forecasting.
Based on these conclusions, it is very likely that Iran may initiate some type of conflict in
the region very soon. Iraq seems like a very attractive target for Iran because of its
current instability and its close proximity to Iran. I do not think Iran will engage in a fullscale war against Iraq, but I do think there is a high probability for minor conflicts to
occur initiated by Iran against Iraq in the very near future.
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However, it is interesting to note that despite its threats towards the United States
and Israel, I do not think that Iran itself will initiate against either of these states anytime
soon. Instead, I think it is very likely that Israel will be targeted in the near future by a
state-sponsored terrorist organization associated with Iran. Iran is in a powerful position
in the Middle East right now. First, they know that any type of state-sponsored terrorist
organization with which they are involved can get away with almost anything. So, why
would Iran risk their own stability and safety to officially launch an attack against Israel
when they do not have to? Second, the Iranians know that the United States would be one
of the only states to rush to Israel's defense in the event of an attack by a terrorist
organization, and the U.S. is not in a political position to be able to go after any other
states that they believe are sponsoring terrorism. Finally, the Islamic community will
simply not turn against their Muslim brothers in Iran to defend Israel. So, I think that it is
unlikely that we will see an official Iranian attack against Israel. However, I do think that
it is extremely probable that we will see an Iranian state-sponsored terrorist organization
attack Israel in the relatively near future.
In order for conditional probability analysis to be useful as a reliable method of
political forecasting in the Middle East, terrorist organizations will have to be included in
conflict data in some way. All three Middle Eastern scenarios discussed in this paper
involve state-sponsored terrorism of some type. Unfortunately, terrorism is the "way of
the world" in the Middle East right now. If they are included, conditional probability
could be a vital tool in predicting international conflicts in the Middle East.
It is evident from this study that dyadic interactions strongly affect the probability

of subsequent dyadic interactions. Dyadic interactions almost guarantee another dyadic
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interaction of some type. This knowledge can be extremely useful in predicting future
political events and conflicts. This method of analysis should become especially
important in international conflicts, because it could easily be adapted and applied to any
system in the world. Conditional probability seems to be a useful technique that could be
commonly used by anyone interested in predicting international conflict.

23

References

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce (1984). Forecasting policy decisions: An expected utility
approach to post-Khomeini Iran. Political Science, 17,226-236.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce (1996). The Benefits of a Social Scientific Approach to
Studying International Affairs. In Ngaire Woods, (Ed.), Explaining International
Relations Since 1945. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 49-75.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 1998. "The End of the Cold War: Predicting an Emergent
Property." The Journal o/Conflict Resolution 42 (2),131-155.

Gaddis, John Lewis (1992-1993). International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold
War. International Security, 17 (3), 5-58.

Gaddis, John Lewis (1996). On Moral Equivalency and Cold War History. Ethics and
International Affairs 10.

Ghosn, F., Palmer, G., & Bremer, S. (2004). The MID3 Data Set, 1003-2001:
Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description. Conflict Management and Peace
Science 21,133-154.

24

Ghosn, F., & Bennett, S. (2003). Codebook for the Dyadic Militarized Interstate
Incident Data, Version 3.0. Online: http://cow2.1a.psu.edu.

Johnson, 1, Joslyn, R., & Reynolds, H. (2001). Political Science Research Methods.
Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc.

Lakotos,1. Criticism and the Growth o/Knowledge (pp. 91-195) New York: Cambridge
University Press.

Leng, Russell 1 (2000). Crisis Behavior and War. In John Vasquez (Ed.), What Do We

Know About War? (pp. 235-258) Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, Inc.

Mearsheimer, J., and Walt, S. (2006). The Israel Lobby. London Review o/Books, 28 (6).

Mintz, A., and Schrodt, P. (1987). Distributional Patterns of Regional Interactions: A
Test of the Poisson as a null model. In Claudio Cioffi-Revilla, Richard L. Merritt,
and Dina A. Zinnes, (Eds.), Interaction and Communication in the Global Arena.
Beverly Hills: Sage.

Moaz, Zeev. (2000). The Street Gangs of World Politics - Their Origins, Management,
and Consequences, 1816

1986. In John Vasquez (Ed)., What Do We Know

25

About War? (pp. 111-144) Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,
Inc.

Ray, J., & Russett, B. (1996).The future as arbiter of theoretical
controversies: Predictions, explanations and the end of the Cold War. British

Journal ofPolitical Science, 26, 441-470.

Richardson Arms Race Model (2002). Retrieved May 26,2007, from http://shaktitrincoll.edul--pbrownlarmsrace.html.

Schrodt, P., & Mintz, A. (1988). The conditional probability analysis of
international events data. American Journal of Political Science, 32, 217-230.

Vasquez, John A. (Ed.). (2000). What do we know about war? Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Wayman, Frank W. (2000). Recurrent Disputes and Explaining War. In John Vasquez
(Ed.), What Do We Know About War? (pp. 219-234) Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

26

Table 1
Dyadic Interaction Patterns

Type

Example

Reciprocal

X-? Y=>Y-? X

Actor Initiation

X -? Y=>X -? M

Target Initiation

X -? Y=>M -? Y

Actor Reaction

X -? Y=>M -? X

Target Reaction

X -? Y=>Y -? M

Remote Reaction

X-? Y=>M -? N
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Table 2
MIDS Events 1979
Nation
US
~RlRussia
Iran
Iraq
Egypt
Syria
Lebanon
Jordan
Israel
Saudi Arabia
Kuwait

2001 by Nation
As Actor Initiator
17
11
22
11
3
10
1
0
6
0
14

As Target
14
7
13
21
1
0
2
3

8
5
11

Ratio
1.21
1.57
1.69
.52
3
0
.5
0
.75
0
.36
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Table 3
Yearly Probabilities of Interactions by Dyads

Dyad
US, USSR/Russia
US, Iran
US, Iraq
US, Egypt
Ws,Syria
US, Lebanon
US, Jordan
US, Israel
US, Saudi Arabia
US, Kuwait
USSR/Russia, US
USSR/Russia, Iran
USSR/Russia, Iraq
USSR/Russia, Egypt
USSR/Russia, Syria
USSR/Russia, Lebanon
USSR/Russia, Jordan
USSR/Russia, Israel
USSR/Russia, Saudi Arabia
USSR/Russia, Kuwait

Q609

Unconditional Probability

.2174
.2609
0
10
0
0
0
0
0
.3044
.1739
0
0
10
10
0
0
0
0

Iran, US
Iran, USSR/Russia
Iran, Iraq
Iran, Egypt
Iran, Syria
Iran, Lebanon
Iran, Jordan
Iran, Israel
Iran, Saudi Arabia
Iran, Kuwait

.1739
.0435
.3044
0
0
0
0
0
.1739
.2609

Iraq, US
Iraq, USSR/Russia
Iraq, Iran
Iraq, Egypt
Iraq, Syria
Iraq,Lebanon

.087
0
.1304
0
0
0
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Table 3 (continued)
Yearly Probabilities of Interactions by Dyads

I

Iraq, Jordan
Iraq, Israel
Iraq, Saudi Arabia
Iraq, Kuwait

0
.0435
0
.2174

Egypt, US
Egypt, USSRJRussia
Egypt, Iran
Egypt, Iraq
Egypt, Syria
Egypt, Lebanon
Egypt, Jordan
Egypt, Israel
Egypt, Saudi Arabia
Egypt, Kuwait

0
0
.0435
0
0
0
0
0
0

Syria, US
Syria, USSRJRussia
Syria, Iran
Syria, Iraq
Syria, Egypt
Syria, Lebanon
Syria, Jordan
Syria, Israel
Syria, Saudi Arabia
Syria, Kuwait

.0435
0
0
.087
0
.0435
.087
.1739
0
0

Lebanon, US
Lebanon, USSRIRussia
Lebanon, Iran
Lebanon, Iraq
Lebanon, Egypt
Lebanon, Syria
Lebanon, Jordan
Lebanon, Israel
Lebanon, Saudi Arabia
Lebanon, Kuwait

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
.0435
0
0

Jordan, US
rJOrdan, USSRJRussia

0
0
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Table 3 (continued)
Y
I P robabor
early
I dies 0 fI nteracf Ions bIy D.yad s
Jordan, Iran
0
Jordan, Iraq
0
Jordan, Egypt
0
Jordan, Syria
10
Jordan, Lebanon
0
Jordan, Israel
0
Jordan, Saudi Arabia
0
Jordan, Kuwait
0
0

Israel, US
Israel, USSRIRussia
Israel, Iran
Israel, Iraq
Israel, Egypt
Israel, Syria
Israel, Lebanon
Israel, Jordan
Israel, Saudi Arabia
Israel, Kuwait
Saudi Arabia, US
Saudi Arabia, USSRIRussia
Saudi Arabia, Iran
Saudi Arabia, Iraq
~udi Arabia, Egypt
Saudi Arabia, Syria
Saudi Arabia, Lebanon
Saudi Arabia, Jordan
Saudi Arabia, Israel
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait
Kuwait, US

ffiwait, USSRIRussia
wait,
Kuwait,
Kuwait,
Kuwait,
Kuwait,
Kuwait,
Kuwait,
Kuwait,

Iran
Iraq
Egypt
Syria
Lebanon
Jordan
Israel
Saudi Arabia

10
0
0

~7
.0435
0
.0435
.0435
435
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
.1739
0
0
0
0
0
0
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Table 4
Mean Rank of Conditional Probability by Pattern
Pattern
Unconditional Probability
Reciprocal Interaction
Actor Initiation
Target Initiation
Actor Reaction
Target Reaction
Remote Reaction

3

Mean
.033955
.162489
.187668
.470418
.158645
.34127
.907556

T score
.46418
.419051
.930464
1.52003
.806813
.868917
3.77784*j

Significant at the p<.05 level; two-tailed test
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Table 5
Difference of Means Test
Pattern
Unconditional Probability,
Reciprocal Interaction
Unconditional Probability,
Actor Initiation
Unconditional Probability,
Target Initiation
Unconditional Probability,
Actor Reaction
Unconditional Probability,
Target Reaction
Unconditional Probability,
Remote Reaction

Difference in Means
.128534

-3.33675*

.153713

-2.39547*

.43643

-4.44832*

.12469

-1.99257

.307315

-4.04828*

.873601

-18.339*

T score
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